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SEAT BELT NEGLIGENCE: THE
AMBIVALENT WISCONSIN RULES
MICHAEL K. MCCHRYSTAL*
The mainstay of Wisconsin comparative negligence law is
the principle that whether a victim may recover depends upon
whether the victim's contributory negligence in causing his in-
juries is greater than the causal negligence of another party
from whom recovery is sought. Foley v. City of West Allis'
established an exception to this central principle. Foley held
that a victim's contributory negligence in failing to use an
available seat belt will not be considered in determining
whether a tortfeasor is liable; it only will be considered in de-
termining the extent of that tortfeasor's liability.
The peculiar nature of seat belt negligence2 prompted this
innovation. Seat belt negligence, unlike passive negligence, 3 is
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University. The author expresses his
gratitude to Charles Clausen, James Ghiardi, Kaye Harris, John Kircher, Robert Koe-
nig and Christine Wiseman for their thoughtful comments on an earlier version of this
article.
1. 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983).
2. Failure to wear seat belts is not negligence per se, but:
where seat belts are available and there is evidence before the jury indicating [a]
causal relationship between the injuries sustained and the failure to use seat
belts, it is proper and necessary to instruct the jury in that regard. A jury in
such case could conclude that an occupant of an automobile is negligent in fail-
ing to use seat belts.
Foley, 113 Wis. 2d at 483, 335 N.W.2d at 828 (quoting Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d
362, 387, 149 N.W.2d 626, 640 (1967)).
3. "Passive negligence" is defined in Wisconsin automobile negligence cases as
conduct of a guest in failing to use ordinary care for his own safety in entering
the car or in riding with the host when knowing of a hazard, whether the hazard
be a condition of the car, the condition of the driver, his lack of skill, or any
other hazard. Such negligence may contribute to or be a cause of the guest's
injury or may not, depending upon the facts of the accident and the conduct of
the host, but such negligence is not a cause of the collision or the accident. In
such a case, the collision or accident may be termed the immediate cause or
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
not always causal of the victim's injuries in the usual sense
that but for the failure to use due care, no injuries would have
been suffered; rather, seat belt negligence may operate only to
aggravate the extent of the victim's injuries.4 In other words,
seat belt negligence may not cause some of the victim's inju-
ries but may cause other injuries.
Accident reconstruction experts can sometimes determine,
with a greater or lesser degree of precision and certainty,
which of a victim's injuries would have been prevented by the
use of available seat belts and which would not. The Foley
court held that those aggravated injuries caused by seat belt
negligence are non-compensable. 5
Foley, then, establishes twin holdings: seat belt negligence
is not considered in determining whether a victim may recover
from a tortfeasor; and injuries attributable to seat belt negli-
gence are not compensable in a negligence action. In addition,
the Foley court establishes a five step formula for implement-
ing its twin holdings.
This article comments on both principal holdings in Foley
and on the mechanism by which those holdings are to be im-
plemented. In doing so, the Article suggests how the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court has muddled tort doctrine by virtue of the
rules it fashioned for seat belt negligence cases.
conduit through which the negligence of the host or other driver, or both, causes
the injuries to the guest. If a cause of the accident is related to the hazard in
respect to which the guest was negligent, such passive negligence of the guest is a
contributing cause of his injuries.
Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Wis. 2d 91, 105, 118 N.W.2d 140, 147
(1962).
4. Foley, 113 Wis. 2d at 484-85, 335 N.W.2d at 828-829.
Seat belt negligence and passive negligence also differ in that passive negligence is
not causal of the victim's injuries unless the victim negligently exposed himself to the
very risk which produced the collision. An example would be the driver's sleepiness or
the location at which the driver stops the car. See supra note 2. See also Britton v.
Hoyt, 63 Wis. 2d. 688, 218 N.W.2d 274 (1974). Of course, these differences between
passive negligence and seat belt negligence were not identified until Foley.
Scientific studies appear to confirm that the failure to wear a seat belt may aggravate
a victim's injuries. See generally Hoenig & Shapiro, Safety Belt Use: Some Product
Liability Considerations, J. PROD. LIAB. 153 (1984); Lester, Seatbelts and the Defense of
Contributory Negligence, 57 LAW INST. J. 1058 (1983); Note, The Seat Belt Defense: A
Comprehensive Guide for the Trial Lawyer and Suggested Approach for the Courts, 56
NOTRE DAME LAW. 272 (1980).
5. See infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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I. THE APPORTIONMENT PROBLEM
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized as "the ba-
sic premise behind all tort law"' 6 that a defendant's liability
should be limited "to that portion of harm which he has in
fact caused, as distinguished from harm arising from other
sources." The Foley court anticipates that seat belt negli-
gence often results in additional harm separate from the harm
that results from the initial collision between vehicles or be-
tween a vehicle and some other object. In seat belt negligence
cases, the unrestrained body of the victim can be injured (or
further injured) by coming in contact with objects that would
not be struck if a seat belt had been used. If the trier of fact
finds that a victim failed to use reasonable care for his own
safety in not buckling his seat belt, evidence may show that
this negligence caused some of the victim's injuries.
Not unreasonably, the Foley court used this proposition to
view seat belt negligence cases as involving two seperate inci-
dents. Evidence reconstructing the accident facilitates this bi-
furcation of the whole occurrence into two parts, each of
which is susceptible to different treatment. The two parts of
the typical seat belt negligence case are distinguished and
identified based on which injuries are caused by seat belt negli-
gence.8 The first incident excludes, by definition, any injuries
caused by the failure to wear a seat belt. Having so defined
the first incident, it stands to reason that the negligent failure
to wear a seat belt should have no bearing on whether a
tortfeasor is liable for first incident injuries. The second inci-
6. Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, 121 Wis. 2d 338, 350, 360 N.W.2d 2, 7 (1984).
7. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965), which provides:
§ 433A. Apportionment of Harm to Causes
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes
where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause
to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more
causes.
8. In Foley, the court describes seat belt negligence cases as involving two incidents,
the actual collision and the resulting impact of the occupant of the vehicle against the
vehicle's interior or some other object. Except in very rare circumstances, this second
collision is the only incident in which seat belt negligence may play a role. 113 Wis. 2d
at 485, 335 N.W.2d at 829.
1985]
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dent includes, by definition, injuries that would not have oc-
curred but for the failure to use an available seat belt.9
Problems of fairness and consistency plague the court's
treatment of injuries caused by seat belt negligence. However,
these problems do not infect the court's treatment of injuries
not caused by seat belt negligence. Cases to which Foley ap-
plies will by definition involve victims, some of whose injuries
are unrelated to seat belt use. A fundamental principle of neg-
ligence law provides that the proven absence of a causal link
between an actor's conduct and injuries insulates the actor
from liability for those injuries. 10 The seemingly innovative
holding in Foley that seat belt negligence "should not be used
to determine the injured party's contributory negligence for
purposes of sec. 895.045 [of The Wisconsin Statutes],"'" does
no more than follow this fundamental principle.
The apportionment proposition adopted in Foley is sound,
assuming that the discipline of accident reconstruction is up
to the task of supplying the necessary evidentiary foundation
for decision-making. 12 The Foley court's treatment of the first
9. This distinction between the two incidents differs from the second collision anal-
ysis alluded to in Foley. See supra note 8. In some cases, second collisions may only
produce injuries that would have occurred irrespective of the victim's failure to use a
seat belt. In other cases, second collisions may produce some injuries that would have
occurred irrespective of seat belt negligence and other injuries which seat belt negli-
gence was a substantial factor in causing.
The holding in Foley, by insulating the tortfeasor from liability for injuries caused in
part by the victim's seat belt negligence, divides the injuries on a basis different from
initial collision versus second collision. It is misleading for the Foley court to describe
the two parts of a seat belt negligence case as the first collision and second collision or as
involving two incidents. Most likely, greater clarity could be achieved by describing the
two parts of the case as the seat belt injury part and the basic injury part.
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965). Cf. Collins v. Eli Lilly
Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 107 (1984).
11. Foley, 113 Wis. 2d at 418, 335 N.W.2d at 826.
12. The recent Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor
Sales, 121 Wis. 2d 338, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984), addressed Wisconsin's apportionment of
damages rules. Sumnicht is an automobile negligence case complicated by a product
liability "crashworthiness" issue. Finding that it is contrary to Wisconsin's strict prod-
uct liability law to require a plaintiff to prove what injuries would have been caused had
there been no defect in the automobile, the court held that in second collision cases the
plaintiff only must prove causation of his injuries by defendant's conduct via the sub-
stantial factor test. This plurality holding could be interpreted in either of two ways.
First, it could very well establish that damages may not be apportioned where there is
no reasonable basis for doing so. This is consistent with well-established legal rules. See
e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965). Second, it may establish a
new rule that damages may not be apportioned when to do so would necessitate a deter-
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incident, (injuries not caused by seat belt negligence), seems
altogether sound, indeed almost inescapable.1 3
II. FOLEY's TREATMENT OF INJURIES CAUSED BY SEAT
BELT NEGLIGENCE
The Foley court identifies as one of its goals reducing the
victim's recovery "to the extent that wearing an available seat
belt might have prevented injuries... .4 In other words,
the Foley court seeks to treat the parties in such a way that
"the defendant is not held liable for incremental injuries the
plaintiff could and should have prevented by wearing an avail-
able seat belt."' 5 The victim is to be denied recovery for inju-
ries caused, even in part, by the victim's seat belt negligence.
mination, on a hypothetical or speculative basis, as to what lesser harm would have
been suffered but for the secondary negligence.
This second interpretation of Sumnicht could have substantial consequences for seat
belt negligence rules in Wisconsin. Quoting Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669
F.2d 1199, 1204-05 (8th Cir. 1982), the Sumnicht court identified its concern:
Liability and damage questions are difficult enough within orthodox princi-
ples of tort law without extending consideration to a case of a hypothetical vic-
tim ....
.A rule of law which requires a plaintiff to prove what portion of indivisi-
ble harm was caused by each party and what might have happened in lieu of
what did happen requires obvious speculation and proof of the impossible. This
approach converts the common law rules governing principles of legal causation
into a morass of confusion and uncertainty.
Sumnicht, 121 Wis. 2d at 355-56, 360 N.W.2d at 10.
Applying this concern to seat belt negligence cases, one would havelo conclude that
the Foley approach would rarely be applied. Foley calls for reducing recovery "to the
extent that wearing an available seat belt might have prevented injuries." 113 Wis. 2d
at 487, 335 N.W.2d at 829-30. In many seat belt negligence cases, this would mean
determining what might have happened in lieu of what did happen, an exercise con-
demned in Mitchell and Sumnicht as involving "obvious speculation and proof of the
impossible." Mitchell, 669 F.2d at 1204-05; Sumnicht, 121 Wis. 2d at 356, 360 N.W.2d
at 10 (quoting Mitchell).
If Sumnicht applies in seat belt negligence cases, Foley is effectively emasculated and
would apply only in the rare seat belt negligence case in which seat belt injuries are
caused at a different time (perhaps only different by seconds) than all of the victim's
basic injuries. See infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
13. But see supra note 12.
14. 113 Wis. 2d 475, 487, 335 N.W.2d 824, 830 (1983).
15. Id. at 489, 335 N.W.2d at 830-31.
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A. Superseding Cause
One effect of the court's decision as to injuries caused by
seat belt negligence is to treat seat belt negligence as if it were
a superseding cause of those injuries.
Injuries caused by seat belt negligence are the result of
concurring causes, 16 including any negligent conduct in caus-
ing the collision, any passive negligence on the victim's part
and the seat belt negligence itself. In Foley, the court immu-
nized tortfeasors from the full consequences of their negli-
gence by placing sole responsibility for injuries caused by seat
belt negligence on the victim. 17 This holding is substantially
out of tune with modem Wisconsin case law concerning su-
perceding cause.
In MeFee v. Harker,1 8 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts section 447 for deter-
mining whether the negligent conduct of a second actor super-
sedes the negligent conduct of a first actor, so as to make the
second actor solely responsible for resulting harm. Section
447 provides:
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent
in itself or is done in a negligent manner does not make it a
superseding cause of harm to another which the actor's neg-
ligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing out, if
(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have
realized that a third person might so act, or
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when
the act of the third person was done would not regard it as
highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted, or
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation
created by the actor's conduct and the manner in which it is
done is not extraordinarily negligent.19
If seat belt negligence can be viewed as an intervening act,
clauses (a) and (b) of section 447 would rule out treating the
victim's seat belt negligence as a superseding cause.20 Thus,
16. "Concurring causes" are two or more causes which combine to produce a sin-
gle result and each is a substantial factor in bringing about the result. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A comment i (1965).
17. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
18. 261 Wis. 213, 219, 52 N.W.2d 381, 384 (1952).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447 (1965).
20. Certainly, it is foreseeable that a fairly large number of users of streets and
highways do not buckle their seat belts. Legislation mandating the use of seat belts
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under the Restatement rule as adopted in McFee and affirmed
in U.S. Fidelity v. Franti Industries,21 the victim's seat belt
negligence would not constitute the sole, legally responsible
cause of aggravated injuries caused by seat belt negligence.
Certainly, the active negligence giving rise to the collision
in which the victim's seat belt negligence produces aggravated
injuries continues as a substantial factor in producing those
aggravated injuries. The successive tort rule of Johnson v.
Heintz, 22 in which negligence producing a first collision con-
tinued to operate as a legal cause of a second collision a short
time later, makes this abundantly clear.23
In any event, the rule expressed in Foley that aggravated
injuries are attributable solely to seat belt negligence cannot be
justified under superseding cause principles for an additional
reason. The victim's seat belt negligence will not constitute an
"intervening act of a third person" under Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts section 447. A tortfeasor's active negligence in
causing the collision will invariably occur after the victim's
negligence in failing to use an available seat belt. If any act is
could, conceivably, change this. See Towers, The Significance of Plaintifis Failure to
Wear a Safety Belt Under Wisconsin Law, 58 Wis. B. BULL. 13 (1985). For the time
being and into the foreseeable future, however, reasonable motorists know that others
might not use their seat belt or that such nonuse is not highly extraordinary.
21. 72 Wis. 2d 478, 490, 241 N.W.2d 421, 428 (1976).
22. 61 Wis. 2d 585, 213 N.W.2d 85 (1973); Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243
N.W.2d 815 (1976).
23. It is inconceivable that a court would find that active negligence in causing a
collision is not a substantial factor in bringing about seat belt injuries. See Johnson v.
Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 302, 243 N.W.2d 815, 826 (1976), in which the court held: "The
negligence of an actor in causing a collision can expose him to liability for the further
damage proximately caused when additional impacts occur."
For some reason, though, the Wisconsin court ignores the "substantial factor" test
in cases involving seat belt injuries. Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 628, 273
N.W.2d 233 (1979), affirms this unique treatment of seat belt injuries in a product liabil-
ity setting involving a defective seat belt. In Austin, plaintiff's decedent, who was driv-
ing her car at an excessive speed, was killed in a one-car collision. The collision was
caused by the driver's negligence in respect to speed and to management and control.
Death resulted from the collision because of the defective condition of the seat belt that
the driver was wearing. The court held that the driver's negligence in causing the one-
car accident was not, ipso facto, a contributing legal cause of the driver's death in the
collision. The apparent basis for this conclusion is that the driver may have been unin-
jured were it not for the defective seat belt. The defendant failed to offer evidence to
prove that the plaintiff's negligent driving into a tree was a substantial factor in causing
her injuries. It is difficult to understand how a collision is not a substantial factor in
producing a death from impact in the collision.
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intervening, it is the active negligence of the tortfeasor in caus-
ing the collision. Moreover, section 447 clearly limits super-
seding cause principles to acts by persons other than the
victim.
B. Public Policy
If the Foley rule regarding injuries caused by seat belt neg-
ligence cannot be justified on superseding cause grounds, its
justification must rest on public policy considerations.
Under Wisconsin negligence law, an actor may be relieved
of liability for injuries caused by his negligent conduct if
sound public policy considerations warrant such relief.24 On
this basis, a firefighter was denied recovery against a railway
which negligently caused a fire25 and a driver who was injured
when he negligently extended his arm out of the window of his
car was permitted to recover from a negligent defendant.2 6
Colla v. Mandella27 summarizes the circumstances in which
public policy factors will justify relief notwithstanding an ac-
tor's causal negligence:
It is recognized by this and other courts that even when the
chain of causation is complete and direct, recovery against
the negligent tort-feasor may sometimes be denied on
grounds of public policy because the injury is too remote
from the negligence or too "wholly out of proportion to the
culpability of the negligent tortfeasor," or in retrospect it ap-
pears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should
have brought about the harm, or because allowance of recov-
ery would place too unreasonable a burden upon users of the
highway, or be too likely to open the way to fraudulent
claims, or would "enter a field that has no sensible or just
stopping point."21 8
24. See A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214 N.W.2d
764 (1974); Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 232, 234 N.W. 372, 376 (1931). Of
course, sound public policy considerations are applicable in superseding cause cases as
well. For example in Merlino v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 23 Wis. 2d 571, 581, 127
N.W.2d 741, 747 (1964), the court held that "in order for the intervening act of negli-
gence to constitute a superseding cause, it must be such that the conscience of the court
would be shocked if the first actor were not relieved from liability."
25. Haas v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 48 Wis. 2d 321, 179 N.W.2d 885 (1970).
26. Schilling v. Stockel, 26 Wis. 2d 525, 133 N.W.2d 335 (1965).
27. 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).
28. Id. at 598-99, 85 N.W.2d at 348.
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None of these factors justifies relieving a tortfeasor who causes
a collision from liability for injuries caused concurrently by
the tortfeasor's conduct and by the victim's seat belt
negligence.
The Foley court believes that it is unfair to hold the
tortfeasor liable for the victim's aggravated injuries, "injuries
that the passengers with minimal effort could have pre-
vented." 29 It almost appears that the court is impressed by
the high culpability involved in seat belt negligence as com-
pared with the tortfeasor's active negligence, at least in rela-
tion to the aggravated injuries.30 The court seems to overlook
the possibility that the active negligence of the tortfeasor may
have consisted of drunk driving, very excessive speed, falling
asleep at the steering wheel, or other highly culpable conduct.
The Foley formula ignores variations in the nature of the ac-
tive negligence: it categorically holds that injuries caused in
part by seat belt negligence will be attributed solely to seat belt
negligence, irrespective of the other causes which necessarily
contributed to the result.31
This categorical treatment of seat belt negligence is anti-
thetical to the purpose of comparative negligence. Unless one
of the extraordinary circumstances identified in Colla v.
Mandella is present,32 persons at fault in causing an accident
should be subject to an "equitable distribution of the loss in
relation to the respective contribution of the faults causing
it."33
Except as limited by Wisconsin Statute section 895.045, 34
comparative negligence rules seek to achieve the result that
29. Foley, 113 Wis. 2d at 489, 335 N.W.2d at 831.
30. This implied emphasis on culpability seems present because of the court's focus
on the minimal effort in seat belt use. Of course, it is also true that minimal effort is
required to stay within the speed limit, keep a good lookout and come to a complete
stop at a stop sign. These minimal efforts prevent collisions in the first place and avert
any injury.
3 1. But for the collision, seat belt injuries would not occur. See supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
32. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
33. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 17, 114 N.W.2d 105, 113 (1962).
34. Wis. STAT. § 895.045 provides:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in
injury to person or property, if such negligence was not greater than the negli-
gence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
1985]
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losses are borne by parties in relation to those parties' causal
negligence in bringing about the losses. This objective is
achieved through special verdict questions,35 through contri-
bution actions, 36 and through rules governing releases and
satisfaction.37 Foley eschews this objective. Relief for seat belt
injuries would be denied, under Foley, even though the seat
belt negligence was very minor and the active negligence was
very substantial. Consider a case in which a drunk defendant
driving at twice the legal speed injures a plaintiff who failed to
buckle his seat belt while moving his car from the street in
front of his house into his garage. The jury could find the
plaintiff negligent in failing to use his seat belt. 38 More signifi-
cantly, if the plaintiff's injuries were substantially aggravated
by the concurrence of seat belt negligence and the drunk
driver's active negligence, the jury, in following Foley's direc-
tive to place all blame for seat belt injuries on the victim, 39
could provide a grossly inadequate recovery to the plaintiff.
Under the holding of Foley, the drunk driver's much greater
fault would be of no consequence. 4° Foley's treatment of inju-
ries caused by seat belt negligence creates the very substantial
risk of unjust and unwarranted results.
III. THE FOLEY FORMULA
In implementing its twin holdings, which were designed to
shield tortfeasors from liability for injuries caused by seat belt
negligence while not shielding them from liability for other
injuries, the Foley court established a five-step process for cal-
culating damages:
shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to
the person recovering.
35. See Foley, 113 Wis. 2d at 491-93, 335 N.W.2d at 831-32 n.13.
36. See Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 383, 202
N.W.2d 268 (1972).
37. See Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963).
38. See Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
39. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
40. Although the weaknesses of Foley's treatment of injuries caused by seat belt
negligence most easily can be demonstrated by showing how fault principles are de-
feated, other objectives of tort law also are defeated by the Foley approach. In the
drunk driver example, the tort objectives of deterrence, risk distribution and victim
compensation are defeated as well.
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(1) Determine the causal negligence of each party as to the
collision of the two cars; (2) apply comparative negligence
principles to eliminate from liability a defendant whose neg-
ligence causing the collision is less than the contributory
negligence of a plaintiff causing the collision; (3) using the
trier of fact's calculation of the damages, reduce the amount
of each plaintiff's damages from the liable defendant by their
percentage of negligence attributedto the plaintiff for causing
the collision; (4) determine whether the plaintiff's failure to
use an available seat belt was negligence and a cause of in-
jury, and if so what percentage of the total negligence caus-
ing the injury was due to the failure to wear the seat belt;
(5) reduce the plaintiff's damages calculated in step (3) by
the percentage of negligence attributed to the plaintiff under
step (4) for failure to wear an available seat belt for causing
the injury. 1
The court however expressed some ambivalence about
steps (4) and (5). Elsewhere in the opinion 42 and in a foot-
note, 3 the court suggested that, rather than accounting for
injuries caused by seat belt negligence by having the jury ap-
portion the percentage of causal negligence attributable to the
victim's failure to wear a seat belt, the jury might apportion
the percentage of damages attributable to the victim's failure
to wear a seat belt. The court seems to regard these alterna-
tives as functionally equivalent, apparently preferring the per-
centage of damages approach if and when appropriate jury
instructions are drafted to implement this new type of special
verdict apportionment question.44
Step (4) of the Foley formula calls for determining "what
percentage of the total negligence causing the injury" was due
to seat belt negligence. This determination appears on its face
to involve the usual comparative negligence concerns. Ordi-
narily, when assigning percentages of causal negligence, the
jury will determine how much each party is "to blame for the
injuries," and percentages are to be assigned "to each party in
proportion to the fault [that party] contributed" to cause the
41. 113 Wis. 2d at 490, 335 N.W.2d at 831 (references to apportionment tables
omitted).
42. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
43. 113 Wis. 2d at 495, 335 N.W.2d at 833, and id. at n.15.
44. Id.
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injuries.45 In making this determination, "[i]t is the conduct
of the parties considered as a whole which should control. 4 6
These rules directly conflict with the Foley court's intent
to not hold the defendant liable "for incremental injuries the
plaintiff could have and should have prevented by wearing an
available seat belt."'47 As such, it is difficult to understand the
court's seemingly mild invitation to the Wisconsin Civil Jury
Instructions Committee to draft "an instruction which advises
the jury that if it determines that the failure to wear a seat belt
was a cause of the person's injuries, the jury must determine
what percentage of the total damages for that person's per-
sonal injuries was caused by his or her failure to wear a seat
belt."'48 Such an instruction would be consistent with the
holding and rationale of Foley but would be a radical depar-
ture from step (4) of the Foley formula, at least in regard to
the way that determinations of the percentage of causal negli-
gence of each actor have previously been made in Wisconsin.
Trial courts now have two options: first, to proceed under step
(4) of the Foley formula as they would typically proceed in
determining percentages of causal negligence; or second, to
proceed as if step (4) truly contemplates determining what
percentage of injuries (rather than fault) are attributable to
seat belt negligence. The difference, which seems not to have
been clearly recognized by the Foley court, is substantial.
In addition to the problem with the Foley formula related
to step (4), a second unusual feature appears in the formula.
Perhaps looking to the future use of a question requiring ap-
portionment of damages, the Foley system of arithmetic differs
from that usually applied in negligence cases involving more
than one comparison of fault. The traditional method of
arithmetic for determining the rights and liabilities of parties
when the claimant is guilty of passive negligence is to "scale
down" the parties' active negligence in causing the collision,
so that when the percentages of all the parties (including the
passively negligent claimant) are totalled, the sum is one hun-
dred percent. Thus, for example, if a claimant was 20% at
45. See Wis. J. I. - Civil 1585, 1590 (1981).
46. Sailing v. Wallestad, 32 Wis. 2d 435, 439, 145 N.W.2d 725, 727 (1966) (quoting
Maus v. Cook, 15 Wis. 2d 203, 207, 112 N.W.2d 589, 591 (1961)).
47. 113 Wis. 2d at 489, 335 N.W.2d at 831.
48. Id. at 495, 335 N.W.2d at 833 (emphasis added).
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fault in causing the collision and the claimant was 25% re-
sponsible for his own injuries through passive negligence, the
claimant would be 40% at fault for his own injuries (i.e., .20
X .75 = .15; .15 + .25 = .40). If the claimant's total dam-
ages are assessed at $10,000, he would recover $6,000.
The Foley formula takes a different path, though it reaches
the same result. Step (3) in the formula calls for a calculation
of "a plaintiff's provable damages by the usual rules of negli-
gence without regard to the seat belt defense." 19 The results
of the seat belt negligence apportionment question are then
applied to the damages figure determined in step (3).
Assume a similar hypothetical to that presented above: A
claimant is 20% at fault in causing the collision and 25% re-
sponsible for his injuries through seat belt negligence.50 If the
claimant's total damages are assessed at $10,000, under step
(3) of the Foley formula, the claimant's damages would be re-
calculated as $8,000 (i.e., $10,000 X .80). The claimant's
$8,000 in damages then would be reduced, under step (5), by
25% resulting in a $6,000 recoverable damage award. In
other words, though the Foley formula for seat belt negligence
differs from the traditional formula for passive negligence, in
analogous sets of facts, identical results are achieved.
This being so, why does the Foley court prescribe an unfa-
miliar formula? Most likely the court's attraction to appor-
tioning damages rather than comparing causal negligence
provides the answer. The Foley court seems inclined to view
basic injuries51 as a first incident and seat belt injuries as a
second incident. With this view in mind, the court then
adopts a formula very analogous to the approach taken in suc-
cessive torts cases. The court radically departs from the suc-
cessive torts framework, however, by cutting off the liability of
original tortfeasors for second incident injuries. This protec-
tion from liability is granted to the original tortfeasors even
though their breach of a duty constitutes a substantial factor
in producing the "second incident" injuries.
49. 113 Wis.2d at 486, 335 N.W.2d at 829.
50. See supra notes 44-45 and text accompanying notes. The text points out that
Foley is unclear as to what it would mean for a claimant to be 25% responsible for his
injuries through seat belt negligence.
51. That is, injuries that were not caused by seat belt negligence.
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IV. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
The Foley rules for seat belt negligence suffer from three
serious flaws: first, they represent bad, even archaic policy, by
treating contributory negligence for failing to wear a seat belt
as an absolute bar to recovery for injuries caused, in part, by
the seat belt negligence; second, the holding and rationale of
Foley appear to conflict with step (4) of the Foley formula; and
third, the Foley formula prescribes unfamiliar arithmetic com-
putations in a half-hearted effort to treat seat belt negligence
like a successive tort. These flaws result from a decision that
is innovative but that is too timid or too ambiguous to go the
distance. 2
A. The Successive Tort Approach
The injustice and oddity of the Foley formula could be
cured by continuing on the bold path initiated by the court.
Basic injuries and seat belt injuries could be treated as sepa-
rate tort occurrences, similar to successive torts. Damages
could be apportioned as between basic and seat belt injuries.
In addition, fault could be apportioned as to each set of inju-
ries. In apportioning fault for basic injuries, seat belt negli-
gence would play no role, because it would not be causal.
However, in apportioning fault for seat belt injuries, seat belt
negligence would be compared with the active negligence of
other parties. In this second apportionment and solely for the
purposes of the seat belt injuries, seat belt negligence could be
used to determine the injured party's contributory negligence
for purposes of Wisconsin Statute section 895.045." 3
Although some victims who are guilty of seat belt negligence
would be denied recovery for seat belt injuries under this ap-
proach, under the Foley formula all such victims are denied
recovery. The attraction of the successive tort approach is its
consistency with existing principles of negligence law and its
fundamental fairness, at least to the extent that Wisconsin's
comparative negligence rules are now fundamentally fair. The
52. Here, I only refer to the problems of apportioning damages and comparing
fault for purposes of determining the extent of recovery. The Foley court makes a very
successful bold move in its holding that seat belt negligence should not be used to deter-
mine the claimant's right to recovery.
53. See supra note 34.
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successive tort approach in seat belt negligence cases is the
logical conclusion of the process begun in Foley; it removes
from the Foley formula the regressive rule that seat belt negli-
gence is an absolute bar to recovery for the injuries as to
which it is a concurrent cause.
Adopting a successive tort approach in seat belt negligence
cases would add much consistency and clarity. One very
troubling problem would remain, however, and that is
whether set belt negligence rules would then be consistent
with product liability crashworthiness rules under Sumnicht v.
Toyota Motors Sales. 54 Seat belt negligence cases and product
liability crashworthiness cases are similar in that each typi-
cally involves active negligence by some party or parties in
causing a collision, and additional fault by other parties in in-
creasing the extent of harm actually suffered. In crashworthi-
ness cases, this additional fault entails selling a vehicle that is
defective and unreasonably dangerous as to the "overall pro-
tection [the] vehicle gives its passengers in a collision."55 In
seat belt negligence cases, however, the fault pertains to a pas-
senger negligently failing to use an available seat belt. Under
Foley, seat belt negligence cases turn on distinguishing be-
tween what injuries in fact resulted and what injuries would
have resulted if seat belt negligence were not present. Under
Sumnicht, the court may have disallowed distinctions in
crashworthiness cases between what injuries in fact resulted
and what injuries would have resulted if a crashworthiness de-
fect were not present.
5 6
Sumnicht may be distinguished from Foley in that strict
product liability5 7 involves substantially different public policy
concerns than seat belt negligence.5 8 Moreover, Sumnicht
54. 121 Wis. 2d 338, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984).
55. Id. at 348, 360 N.W.2d at 6, n.4 (quoting Foland, Enhanced Injury: Problems of
Proof in "Second Collision" and "Crashworthy Cases," 16 WASHBURN L.J. 600, 607
(1977)).
56. But see supra note 12.
57. Liability under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A for harm caused
by defective products is treated as negligence per se in Wisconsin. See Dippel v. Sciano,
37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
58. Sumnicht and Foley may be distinguished based upon the nature of the duty
breached, the deterrent intent and effect of the rules, and the economics involved. Prod-
uct liability may be imposed upon a seller who is not, in the ordinary sense or the tort
sense, at fault or blameworthy. Negligence presumes the opposite. In addition, product
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and Foley are consistent in permitting the victim some recov-
ery and in placing the burden of apportioning damages on the
defendant5 9 It also should be noted that Sumnicht is a plural-
ity opinion, with three members of the court joining in a con-
curring opinion 6° and one member of the court dissenting.61
Sumnicht, like Foley, raises issues that require clarifica-
tion. The court's approach to apportionment of damages in
cases not involving actual successive torts is clearly in a
germinating stage. The court may choose to treat seat belt
negligence cases and product liability crashworthiness cases
differently, as Sumnicht and Foley suggest. In any event, an
approach similar to that followed in actual successive torts
cases would seem workable in seat belt negligence cases, as-
suming an adequate evidentiary basis for apportioning dam-
ages. If this approach, foreshadowed in Foley, is followed in
seat belt negligence cases, the inconsistencies noted earlier
could be resolved.62
B. The Modified Passive Negligence Approach
The Foley problems can be alleviated by tightening the
reins as well as by loosening them: seat belt negligence could
be made more like its progenitor, passive negligence, rather
than by creating a new generation of quasi-successive torts.
The seat belt negligence apportionment question could oper-
ate exactly as the current passive negligence apportionment
question, except that the Foley rule that seat belt negligence is
liability rules, especially as to retailers of pre-packaged products not susceptible to in-
spections, sometimes have no deterent value, unlike seat belt negligence rules. Finally,
seat belt negligence works to make the victim shoulder the burden of his own injury
unlike product liability which is a risk-spreading device.
59. Sumnicht, 121 Wis. 2d at 355-57, 360 N.W.2d at 10; Foley v. City of West
Allis, 113 Wis. 2d at 489, 335 N.W.2d at 830-31. As a form of contributory negligence,
the defendant would have the burden of pleading and proving that the claimant was
guilty of seat belt negligence and that such negligence caused harm.
60. Chief Justice Heffernan authored the concurring opinion in which Justices
Abrahamson and Bablitch joined, stating that from the wording of the special verdict at
trial, "it is clear that the jury concluded that all of [the] damages sustained were caused
by the [product defect]." Sumnicht, 121 Wis. 2d at 379-80, 360 N.W.2d at 21. As such,
the plurality's treatment of apportionment of damages is dicta.
61. Justice Steinmetz, in dissent, agreed with the concurring justices that the plu-
rality's treatment of the law of enhanced injuries was unneccessary to the decision.
Sumnicht, 121 Wis. 2d at 384-86, 360 N.W.2d at 23-24.
62. See supra notes 14-50 and accompanying text.
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not used for purposes of section 895.045 could be retained.63
To do so, the court would have to abandon its apportionment
of damages idea and its view that seat belt negligence is the
sole responsible cause for injuries that would not have oc-
curred but for the failure to use a seat belt. To abandon the
apportionment of damages idea is to abandon the successive
tort analogy; to abandon the sole responsible cause view is to
return to the late twentieth century from the early twentieth
century.
A modified passive negligence approach would require a
collision apportionment question. In addition, after determin-
ing the existence of causal seat belt negligence, the jury could
be instructed to answer a seat belt negligence apportionment
question, recognizing that some injuries are caused by the vic-
tim's seat belt negligence as well as by the active negligence of
other parties, and that other injuries are caused only by the
active negligence of other parties. Although such an appor-
tionment question, even coupled with brilliant instructions,
may not yield scientifically "nice" responses, it asks little more
of the jury than the usual multi-claimant case in which passive
negligence is at issue.
The occassional monstrous case may come along, in which
not only a collision apportionment question and a seat belt
negligence apportionment question must be asked, but also a
traditional passive negligence apportionment question. It
should be noted that this identical problem would arise under
the Foley formula with the same set of facts. In addition, as
every torts teacher knows, it is possible for students and for
fate to create fact patterns that strain the rules of comparative
negligence to the limit. In such cases, the logic of the rules
holds up fairly well, even though the patience of judge and
jury may not.
The greatest shortcoming of the Foley case is that it need-
lessly defies rules of comparative negligence, and by doing so
jeopardizes a system that can produce generally consistent
and reasonably fair results. The pre-Foley rules can be used to
accomplish Foley's desirable objectives.
63. The Foley formula already may inadvertently accomplish this result. See supra
notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
Foley reflects a court that is grappling with the enormous
problems of apportioning damages in cases not involving ac-
tual successive torts. Difficulty is inherent in this problem be-
cause frequently evidence is not available to implement logical
and apparently just rules. The complexities of seat belt negli-
gence cases cannot be removed by a single decision. Foley
made progress. More work remains to be done.
